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ANTITRUST COMES TO THE CITIES-ANALYSIS
OF CITY OF LA FA YETTE V. LOUISIANA POWER

& LIGHT CO. AND ITS EFFECT ON MUNICIPAL
ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

On March 29, 1978, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' that cities could
not claim a "state action" exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
absent "evidence that the state authorized or directed a given
municipality to act as it did." 2 The Court rejected the argument of the
cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, that the 1943 Supreme
Court decision of Parkerv. Brown,3 which established an antitrust immunity for states and state mandated activities, applied with equal
force to political subdivisions of a state. Rather, the Court concluded
"that the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct
engaged in as an act of government by the state as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service.'"
Under Lafayette, municipalities' will be held accountable for conduct which contravenes a national policy as critical to the nations wellbeing as the Sherman Antitrust Act. 6 The decision exposes all
municipalities and their officials to felony criminal penalties ranging
up to one million dollars7 and to civil damage awards that are commonly trebled, 8 with an additive for the prevailing plaintiff's attorney's
fees. 9 In addition to forcing municipal attorneys to add antitrust law to
the ever growing list of subjects on which they must be well informed,
the decision has awakened the interest of private lawyers in antitrust
* City Attorney of Walnut Creek, California; A.B., University of San Francisco; J.D., University of San Francisco Law School.
1. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2. Id. at 414.
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
4. 435 U.S. at 413.
5. Whenever the term "municipality" is used, it refers to cities, counties,
townships, and special districts providing local governmental services.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
7. Id. at §§ 1-2.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
9. Id. Such judgments may be based solely on opinion testimony and statistical
economic evidence.
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litigation as a means of collecting money damages from a previously
immune municipality. Because of possible treble damages and attorney
fees the private sector might find this field most attractive.
This article will discuss the effect of this landmark decision on
municipalities. However, a detailed review of the law before Lafayette
and an analysis of the Lafayette decision are important in setting the
proper framework to determine as far as possible the effect of
Lafayette on municipalities.
I.

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: OVERVIEW

The basic federal antitrust statutes are the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 189010 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.11 In describing the
purpose of these laws, the Supreme Court has stated:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete - to
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster. 2
Despite the reputation of federal antitrust regulations as a complex
maze which is difficult to interpret, the basic governing provisions are
stated in disarmingly simple and generalized terms. Thus, section 1 of
the Sherman Act,' 3 provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....

Similarly, section 2 of the Sherman Act" provides: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
10.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).

11.
12.

15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).

13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Persons injured in their "business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may sue in federal district court for the
recovery of treble damages, the cost of the suit, and reasonable attorney's fees. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Additionally, injured persons may sue for injunctive relief against
antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
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with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony. .. ."
Although the federal antitrust laws were originally enacted with a
view toward application against large private corporations operating
on a national level, the generalized wording of the statutes has permitted a judicial evolution in their interpretation, so that today such laws
are applicable against businesses operating primarily on a local level,
and also against municipalities. Thus, even a business or governmental
operation which is essentially local or intrastate in character is subject
to federal antitrust laws, so long as its operations "substantially affect
the flow of goods, services or money across state lines."'" The
Supreme Court has ruled that jurisdiction under federal antitrust laws
is to be interpreted as coterminous with the generally expanded concepts of "interstate commerce" used for purposes of modern constitu6
tional analysis. '
It may be fair to assume that the drafters of the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts never gave any thought to the question of state
and municipal liability under those acts, especially given the limited
economic role which local governments played during that era. Nevertheless, those acts were written in language sufficiently broad to confer
jurisdiction over municipalities. The controlling terms in the acts are
"person" and "persons" - both with reference to who may sue and
who may be sued. By defining "person" or "persons," as used within
the acts "to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of
the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country,"I municipalities and local governments clearly are brought within
the definition. Furthermore, once it was established that municipalities
and states were "persons" for purposes of bringing antitrust actions, 8
it became impossible, simply as a matter of statutory construction, to
argue that the same governmental units were not "persons" against
whom antitrust actions could be brought.

II.

CASE LAW PRIOR TO LAFAYETTE

In Parker v. Brown,'I policy considerations seemed to dictate that
there be some differential in application of antitrust laws between
15. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. Id. at 783-86. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Taxi Weekly,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 539 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12.
18. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works

v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
19.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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private business parties and governmental units. Before the Parker
decision, the Sherman Act as well as other antitrust statutes were not
thought to specifically provide an exemption for conduct undertaken
pursuant to state legislation. Then came Parker, in which a raisin producer brought a Sherman Act suit to enjoin the California Director of
Agriculture from enforcing an agricultural marketing program which
allocated the amount of raisins that a producer could market. The purpose of the state program was to restrict the supply of raisins, thereby
increasing and, ultimately, stabilizing their price. The effect was a
restraint on competition among raisin producers. Under the state's
Agricultural Prorate Act, the decision to adopt a market allocation
program was to be made by a state-appointed commission, following
submission of a petition signed by ten producers. After its formulation
and adoption, the allocation scheme was binding on all California
20
raisin producers.
Addressing the restraint of trade question, Chief Justice Stone
stated that if private individuals had organized and administered the
allocation program, it clearly would have run afoul of the Sherman
Act.2" The Court, however, upheld the program. In analyzing the
legislative history and statutory language of the Sherman Act, the
Court could find no suggestion that it was intended "to restrain a state
' 22
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."
Moreover, principles of federalism forbade interference with a state's
sovereignty where congressional intent was unclear. 3
Subsequently, Parker was interpreted by lower courts to limit application of the antitrust laws only to private competitors, exempting
both states and their agents on the basis that their conduct constituted
"state action" outside the intended scope of the Sherman Act.2" But
this judicial policy of state antitrust immunity was not to be extensively
addressed again by the U.S. Supreme Court for over 30 years. Starting
in 1975, however, the Supreme Court rendered three decisions, with
each decision elucidating and narrowing the parameters of the state
antitrust exemption. The first case was Goldfarb v. Virginia State
25
Bar.
20. Id. at 347.
21. Id. at 350.
22. Id. at 350-51.
23. Id. at 362-63.
24. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 871, 871-72 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 313 F. Supp. 860,
864-69 (M.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972).
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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In Goldfarb, the plaintiffs brought suit under the Sherman Act
against the Fairfax County Bar Association and the Virginia State Bar
alleging, first, that the County Bar Association's adoption of a
minimum fee schedule amounted to price fixing and, second, that the
State Bar's threats of enforcement made it a co-conspirator. The
defendants contended that they were immune from antitrust liability
under the Parker doctrine. In rejecting the argument that the Parker
doctrine applied to this conduct, the Supreme Court redefined and
limited the scope of the state action immunity doctrine.
In holding that neither the State Bar nor the County Bar could
avail themselves of the state action antitrust exemption, the Supreme
Court said that "[t]he threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is State action of the type the Sherman Act was
not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State
acting as sovereign." '2 6 The Court determined that no immunity was
available in this particular instance because it was not evident that the
State of Virginia, through the rules of its highest court, ordered or
directed the anticompetitive activities of either of the respondents. 27
Although the Virginia court's ethical codes mentioned advisory fee
schedules they did not direct either of the respondents to supply the
schedules nor did they require the type of price floor established by the
schedules. Even though the State Bar had been granted the power to
issue ethical opinions, there was no indication in the record that the
Virginia Supreme Court approved the opinions. As to the respondents'
arguments that their activities complemented the objective of the
ethical codes and was state action which would be immune under
Parker, the Court opined "[i]t is not enough that, as the County Bar
puts it, anticompetitive conduct is prompted by State action; rather,
anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State
' 28
acting as a sovereign."
Thus, when the United States Supreme Court reexamined the
Parker doctrine after a thirty-two year hiatus, it held that state action
antitrust immunity could be invoked only in situations which met certain standards. Anticompetitive conduct would no longer be protected
simply because it came under the somewhat wide umbrella of state action. Instead, for Parker to apply, anticompetitive actions must be
directly compelled by the state in its sovereign capacity.
26. Id. at 790.
27. Virginia state law enables the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the legal
profession in Virginia. VA. CODE § 54-48 (1950).
28. 421 U.S. at 791.
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During the next term, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison," the Supreme
Court considered the private immunity aspects of the state action doctrine. The defendant, Detroit Edison, a privately owned utility, provided free light bulbs to its electricity customers. The plaintiff, a retailer
of light bulbs, alleged that Detroit Edison's bulb distribution plan
foreclosed competition in a substantial segment of the light bulb
market and thereby violated the Sherman Act. Detroit Edison claimed
antitrust immunity, asserting that the Michigan Public Service Commission had approved a tariff including the bulb distribution plan and
that this approval compelled its compliance with the tariff.
A divided Court3" held that neither the approval of the light bulb
distribution program by the Public Service Commission nor the inability
of Detroit Edison to terminate the program without prior Commission
agreement would immunize Detroit Edison from antitrust liability. The
Court denied the immunity on two grounds. First, it would not be unfair
to hold Detroit Edison liable for a program which it had initiated and,
second, the state had no regulatory purpose in approving the light bulb
supply program which would be frustrated by application of the antitrust laws. 3 '
The Supreme Court also reexamined the Parkerdoctrine in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona.3 2 In Bates, two attorneys had been adjudged
guilty of violating a disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme Court
which banned lawyer advertising. As a defense, the defendants
asserted that the rule violated the Sherman Act. In this context, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Parkerstate action immunity doctrine precluded antitrust claims against the Arizona State Bar."
Mr. Justice Blackmun's decision distinguished Bates from the facts
in Goldfarb. The Arizona Supreme Court in Bates had affirmatively
commanded the regulation of advertising by the legal profession. In
Goldfarb, the minimum fee schedules were established by the local and
state bar associations and were not commanded by the Virginia
Supreme Court. The Court found that the state and local bar associations in Bates acted merely as agents of the Arizona Supreme Court
29. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
30. Mr. Justice Stevens wrote for a four Justice plurality, including Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall. Mr. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment
and in a major portion of the plurality opinion. Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment on other grounds. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in a
dissenting opinion.
31. 428 U.S. at 594, 598.
32. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
33. The Arizona attorneys claimed successfully that the rule infringed their first
amendment rights. Id. at 363-84.
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and remained under that court's supervision in the enforcement of the
advertising ban.3 4
Unlike the situation in Cantor, the Arizona Supreme Court maintained disciplinary rules which "[reflected] a clear articulation of the
State's policy with regard to professional behavior."" The Bates
Court considered it significant that "the state policy [was] so clearly
and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision [was] so
active." '3 6 Central to the Court's decision was evidence that: (1) there
was a comprehensive scheme of regulation; (2) the scheme of regulation was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;
and (3) the state policy was actively supervised by the state supreme
court as a policy maker. In such circumstances, state action immunity
was properly invoked. This decision appeared to allay some fears
regarding the expansive language of the Cantor decision."
III.

CITY OF LAFAYETTE v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.

A conflict between the circuits3 8 regarding the applicability of the
antitrust laws and state action immunity to municipalities, under the
principles of Parker, Goldfarb, Cantor,and Bates, was resolved by the
U.S. Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.3 9 A divided Court4 held, inter alia, that municipalities are "persons" as defined in the federal antitrust acts. The plurality also concluded that there is no overriding public policy which necessitates a
municipal exemption.
This controversy arose when the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, filed an antitrust suit against Louisiana Power &
Light Co. (LP&L). The plaintiffs alleged that LP&L had combined
and conspired with other privately owned utilities to restrain and
monopolize commerce in the generation, transmission and sale of electric power in violation of federal antitrust laws. LP&L, in turn, filed a
counterclaim against the cities, alleging that the plaintiffs had
34.
35.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.

36. Id.
37. For a good summary of the pre-Lafayette state of the law, see Note, Antitrust
Law and Municipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt from the Sherman Act
Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1547 (1977).
38. Compare Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (municipal
facilities not protected under Parker) with Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 518
F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975) (municipal rate setting protected).
39. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).

40. Justice Brennan wrote for a four Justice plurality including Justices Marshall,
who concurred in part, Powell, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
judgment and in a major portion of the plurality opinion. Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, joined in pertinent part by Justice Blackmun.
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themselves violated the federal laws in the operation of their municipal
utility systems. Specifically, the counterclaim alleged that the cities,
together with a nonparty electric cooperative, had conspired to: (1)
engage in sham litigation against LP&L to prevent the financing and,
thus, the construction of a nuclear electric generating facility; (2)
eliminate competition within the municipal boundaries by use of
covenants in their respective debentures; (3) exclude competition in
certain markets by using long-term supply agreements; and (4) displace
LP&L by requiring area residents to purchase electricity from the cities
as a condition of continued water and gas service.
The cities moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that,
as political subdivisions of the State of Louisiana, the state action doctrine of Parker rendered federal antitrust laws inapplicable to them.
The district court dismissed LP&L's counterclaim, holding that under
the Parkerdoctrine the antitrust laws were inapplicable to cities."' The
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court holding and found that cities
are not automatically exempt from application of the federal antitrust
laws."2 Remanding the case to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held
that the trial court must determine that the state legislature had intended that the cities engage in the anticompetitive action which was the
subject of LP&L's counterclaim.4 3 On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
The cities asserted both legal and public policy arguments in support of their petition to the Supreme Court seeking a reversal of the
41. 435 U.S. at 392.
42. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
43. Id. at 434-35. The court of appeals held that taken together Parker and
Goldfarb require the following analysis:
A subordinate state governmental body is not ipso facto exempt from the
operation of the antitrust laws. Rather, a district court must ask whether the state
legislature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint. In our opinion, though, it is not necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each
act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent. Thus, a trial judge may ascertain,
from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that
the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of. On the other hand,
as in Goldfarb, the connection between a legislative grant of power and the subordinate entity's asserted use of that power may be too tenuous to permit the conclusion that the entity's intended scope of activity encompassed such conduct.
Whether a governmental body's actions are comprehended within the powers
granted to it by the legislature is, of course, a determination which can be made
only under the specific facts in each case. A district judge's inquiry on this point
should be broad enough to include all evidence which might show the scope of
legislative intent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
44. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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Fifth Circuit decision. Initially, the cities argued that the Parker
holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to state governments
should also apply to political subdivisions of states. The petitioners
contended that municipal corporations, as creatures of the state, exercise only those powers delegated to them by the state; therefore, the
immunity enunciated in Parker should also extend to those political
subdivisions.
Alternatively, the petitioners contended that application of the
antitrust laws to municipal governments would substantially disrupt
essential municipal functions. For example, an antitrust suit against a
municipality would not only be expensive to defend, but could also
result in a treble damage award that might bankrupt the municipality.
The mere threat of such a suit could have a chilling effect on municipal
decisionmaking and might foreseeably paralyze many local government functions.
Finally, the cities argued that application of the antitrust laws to
municipal corporations violated the constitutional principle of
federalism which was at the heart of the Parkerdecision. Remedies for
abuse of public power by local officials could be rectified by local law,
state and local political action, and actions for redress of violations of
constitutional rights.
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, rejected all
arguments propounded by the petitioners which would preclude application of the federal antitrust laws to municipal corporations. In
considering the public policy arguments presented by the cities, Justice
Brennan noted that they must be considered in light of the "presumption against implied exclusions from coverage under the antitrust
laws." 4 5 Unless the cities could demonstrate that "there are countervailing policies which are sufficiently weighty to overcome the
46
presumption," the cities' immunity arguments must fail. Justice
Brennan rejected the cities' argument that the antitrust laws were intended to protect the public only from abuses of private power. On
this point he stated that "[pilainly petitioners are in error in arguing
that Parkerheld that all governmental entities, whether state agencies
or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by reason of their status as such,
4 Also, he noted that cities often act
exempt from the antitrust laws."
like private corporations. In such circumstances, they attempt to
realize "maximum benefits . . .without regard to extraterritorial im-

pact and regional efficiency."" Thus, it could not be assumed that a
45. Id. at 398.
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 408.
48. Id. at 404.
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city would act with any more concern for broader national economic
policies than would a private enterprise when it attempted to maximize
the benefits to its constituencies.' 9 He concluded that "the Parker doc49. Id. at 405-07. Justice Brennan reviewed the activity of units of local governments in this country:
In 197.2, there were 62,437 different units of local government in this country.
Of this number 23,885 are special districts which have a defined goal or goals for
the provision of one or several services, while the remaining 38,552 represent the
number of counties, municipalities, and townships, most of which have broad
authority for general governance subject to limitations in one way or another imposed by the State. These units may, and do, participate in and affect the
economic life of this Nation in a great number and variety of ways. When these
bodies act as owners and providers of services, they are fully capable of aggrandizing other economic units with which they interrelate, with the potential of serious
distortion of the rational and efficient allocation of resources, and the efficiency
of free markets which the regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is
thought to engender. If municipalities were free to make economic choices
counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be
introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy Congress established.
We conclude that these additional arguments for implying an exclusion for local
governments from the antitrust laws must be rejected.
Id. at 407-08.
After reviewing Parker, Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, Justice Brennan further
stated:
These decisions require rejection of petitioners' proposition that their status as
such automatically affords governmental entities the 'state action' exemption.
Parker's limitation of the exemption, as applied by Goldfarb and Bates, to
'official action directed by [the] state,' arises from the basis for the 'state action'
doctrine - that given our 'dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,' 317 U.S., at 351, a congressional purpose to subject to
antitrust control the States' acts of government will not lightly be inferred. To extend that doctrine to municipalities would be inconsistent with that limitation.
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of
the States that create them. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12
(1974); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (political subdivisions not
protected by Eleventh Amendment from immunity from suit in federal court).
Parker's limitation of the exemption to 'official action directed by a state,' 317
U.S., at 351, is consistent with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally have
not been treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the serious
economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own
parochial interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust
laws, see supra, at 403-408, we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress
intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach.
On the other hand, the fact that municipalities, simply by their status as such,
are not within the Parker doctrine, does not necessarily mean that all of their anticompetitive activities are subject to antitrust restraints. Since '[mjunicipal corporations are instrumentalities of the State for the convenient administration of
government within their limits,' Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883), the actions of municipalities may reflect state
policy.
Id. at 411-13.
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trine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant
to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service . ...0
Justice Brennan then set forth a standard for assessing the
applicability of the state action immunity doctrine to municipal corporations. He held that state action immunity would apply only when
"the State authorized or directed a given municipality to act as it
did." 5 ' The necessary authorization or direction must be based on a
state policy "to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service."" 2 However, a municipal corporation need not "point
to a specific, detailed legislative authorization before it properly may
assert a Parkerdefense to an antitrust suit.""3 An adequate state mandate for the anticompetitive activities of the state or subordinate
governmental units exists when it is found, "from the authority given a
governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of." 5" Thus, the plurality
provides little direction for municipalities attempting to determine
whether their anticompetitive activities are authorized by the state. It
would be the unusual state grant of authority to a municipality to
operate in a particular area that would include specific authority to
engage in anticompetitive activity.
As stated, only three other Justices joined in Justice Brennan's
opinion, with Chief Justice Burger writing a concurring opinion to
make the necessary majority. Chief Justice Burger concurred only in
that part of the Court's opinion which found that municipalities are
"persons" under the antitrust laws, and that there is no overriding
public policy which supports an implicit municipal exemption. The
Chief Justice took a different approach to the "state action" question,

50. 435 U.S. at 413.

51. Id.at 414.
52. Id.at 413.
53. Id.at 415.
54. Id. (quoting 532 F.2d at 434). Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion,
enunciated an even more restrictive requirement for a municipal state action exemption. He argued that the state must compel the anticompetitive activity and the exemption would apply only if the activity engaged in by the city was essential to carry out
the state's regulatory plan. 435 U.S. at 420-26 (citing Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,

428 U.S. at 597). Justice Marshall also concurred in the decision. However, he asserted
that Chief Justice Burger's concern that the exemption might apply to cities in cir-

cumstances where the state mandate was unclear was unwarranted. In Justice Marshall's view, Justice Brennan's opinion made it clear that anticompetitive restraints
entered into by the city must be no more than necessary to effectuate governmental
purposes of the state in permitting the activity. 435 U.S. at 418.
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and offered his view of what a municipality might need to show in
order to obtain the benefit of the state's Parker exemption. He suggested a governmental/proprietary distinction, with the issue being
whether the Sherman Act reaches the proprietary enterprises of
municipalities." Chief Justice Burger believed that the Court had
already recognized "for purposes of federalism, the difference between
a state's entrepreneurial personality and a sovereign's decision - as in
Parker - to replace competition with regulation." 5 6 He agreed with
the plurality that the threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not
meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the state acting
as sovereign. However, he argued that this is only the first, not the
final step of the inquiry, and he relied on Cantor's recognition that all
economic regulation does not necessarily suppress competition.
The problem inherent in the Chief Justice's approach was pointed
out in Justice Stewart's dissent:
[Tihe scope of the immunity envisioned by The Chief Justice is virtually impossible to determine. The distinction between 'proprietary' and 'governmental' activities has aptly been described as
a 'quagmire . . . [with] distinctions so finespun and capricious as

to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation.' . . . The separate opinion of The Chief Justice does

nothing to make these distinctions any more substantial or
understandable. Indeed, even a moment's consideration of the
range of services provided today by governments shows how difficult it is to determine whether or not they are 'proprietary.'"
Justice Stewart further argued that not only did the plurality's decision
violate principles of federalism, but it also constituted "an extraordinary intrusion" into municipal affairs, diminishing the powers of
autonomous local governmental bodies and requiring greater state
involvement in local government affairs. 8 Mr. Justice Stewart also
attacked the majority opinion for the vagueness of the standard enunciated for application of the state action exemption to municipalities.
Specifically, he criticized the interchangeable use of the terms
"authorized" and "directed" in Justice Brennan's opinion because
these words have very different meanings. He also suggested that the
standard failed to clarify the degree of specificity required in the
55.
56.
57.
58.

435 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 433-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 434.
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legislative directives before immunity could be invoked by a
municipality for anticompetitive conduct. 9
In a separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun challenged
"the nonchalance with which the Court puts aside the question of
remedy."'" The Court had suggested that the remedy of treble
damages "may" not be "appropriate" for municipalities. Therefore,
Justice Brennan had held that it was not necessary to consider the
question of remedy at this stage of the litigation.6 Justice Blackmun
pointed out, however, that the treble damages provisions of the
Clayton Act are mandatory for violations of the Sherman Act and that
the majority had failed to suggest standards for determining an
appropriate alternative remedy. In his view, refusal to consider the
appropriateness of various remedies at this time placed an unacceptable burden upon municipal governments. 2
IV.

A.

MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AFTER CITY OF LAFAYETTE

In General

As a result of the Lafayette decision, municipalities must now
assess the antitrust implications of the multitude of activities in which
they are engaged. An initial step in assessing potential antitrust liability
will involve inquiry into the statutory authority for each area of
municipal activity. When the municipal corporation is engaged in anticompetitive conduct, municipal authorities must establish that the state
as sovereign has expressed an intent to "displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service."' 63 The Supreme Court in
Lafayette held that intent is established "when it is found 'from the
authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area,
that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' ",64
Evidence of a state policy to displace competition with regulation
may be established by explicit statutory, judicial, or executive delegation of authority by appropriate state officials 6 or by examination of
59. Id. at 435-38. In his opinion the Court's failure to provide municipalities with
standards by which they could assess the legality of their conduct would severely handicap municipal governments not only in carrying out essential public services but also in
creative municipal experimentation. Id. at 439.
60. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 401 n.22.
62. Id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. 435 U.S. at 413.
64. Id. at 415 (quoting 532 F.2d at 434).
65. This criterion focuses on the persons who have the authority to direct the
municipalities to engage in the anticompetitive conduct. If the state legislature, the
state supreme court, or an executive regulatory body has complete authority in a
designated area of state activity and it directs or, at least, authorizes the antiimmunity
competitive
Published
by conduct,
eCommons,
1980 will likely apply. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
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the legislative history of the statute under which the municipality
operates. 66 A state policy to displace competition can also be inferred
from the nature of the regulation. Utility regulation, for instance,
implicitly involves a state decision to limit entry and control rates.6 7 In
addition, a state policy may also be inferred from active state supervision.6 But if a municipality cannot point to some clear articulation of
state policy which directs the municipality to engage in anticompetitive
conduct, it is unlikely that a court will cloak the municipality's conduct
with antitrust immunity.
Whether broad delegations of managerial authority to municipalities will provide sufficient legal insulation for a municipality offering
monopoly public service, or granting exclusive contracts for the provision of such service, is open to question. Prior to the Goldfarb decision, several courts found that municipalities were immune from antitrust suits when they were empowered to provide public services such
as bus transportation. Monopolization of the activity or the granting
of an exclusive license for the provision of such service was immunized
by the state's broad delegation of managerial power.69 Goldfarb called
into question the ability of municipalities or other governmental bodies
to shield themselves behind general enabling statutes. The Lafayette
decision held that explicit state delegation is not required. There must,
however, be an expression of intent by the state to replace competition
with regulation. Thus, when a state merely authorizes a municipality to
engage in an activity but does not specifically authorize it, directly or
indirectly, to monopolize conduct, that conduct may not be immunU.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). When a lower governmental unit acts outside the scope of its
authority, or private citizens act in a governmental capacity and authorize the anticompetitive conduct, the Court may find that the state, as sovereign, did not make the
decision to displace competition with regulation. See City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp.
Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.
v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947
(1966); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959),
aff'd, 294 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1961).
66. Unfortunately, many states do not maintain legislative histories or other
records of their policy decisions.
67. Mobilfone of Northeastern Pa., Inc. v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 428 F.
Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
68. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir. 1975)
(state had expressly authorized the municipality to set telephone rates).
69. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413
(1978).
70. See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258
(6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433
F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966).
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ized. 0 But when a state specifically permits a municipality to
monopolize activities in a given area, that authorization should be a
sufficient expression of the requisite intent. It should permit the
municipality to contract exclusively for the provision of that service.
Assuming arguendo that the necessary intent to displace competition can be demonstrated, the municipality must establish that the
state "authorized or directed" the anticompetitive conduct. Whether
or not the interchangeable use of "authorized" and "directed" constitutes a dilution of the "compulsion" standard set out in Goldfarb is
unclear. Caution would suggest that municipalities evaluate their
authority to engage in what would normally be considered anticompetitive conduct under a "compulsion" standard. In Lafayette,
Justice Brennan indicated that the necessary compulsion can be
established by evidence of a state policy, requiring anticompetitive
conduct, which is: (1) clearly articulated; (2) affirmatively expressed;
and (3) actively supervised by the policymaker.7 ' In the absence of any
of these elements, it is unlikely a court would find "authorization," let
alone "direction" or "compulsion," and a state action defense would,
therefore, be denied.
B.

How to Find Evidence of Legislative Intent

Because the courts have yet to articulate what they will accept from
municipalities as evidence of state legislative intent, municipalities
must now seek to select and follow a general rule of construction,
because specific state authorization will seldom be available.
Municipalities might then, through such a rule of construction, show
the court that the state legislature considered the cost of the anticompetitive impact of municipal activities, and nonetheless agreed to
allow such an impact. Municipalities, however, will rarely have specific
legislative histories upon which to rely.
One such possible rule would be the rule of laissez-faire - that the
state has not disapproved of the arguably anticompetitive act of a
municipality. The plurality opinion in Lafayette offers some support
for this view:
Our decision will render a State no less able to allocate governmental power between itself and its political subdivisions. It means
only that when the State itself has not directed or authorized an
anticompetitive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their
71.

435 U.S. at 410. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91

(1975); Areeda & Turner, An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 1
ANTITRUST LAW 90-92 (1978).
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characterizing the Parker exemption as fully applicable to local
governmental units simply by virtue of their status as such, the approach taken by the dissent would hold anticompetitive municipal
action free from federal antitrust enforcement even when state
statutes specifically provide that municipalities shall be subject to
the antitrust laws of the United States. 12
Another example of the laissez-faire construction would be found
where the state delegates to municipalities an extreme amount of
"home rule" power. The problem with this approach is that there is no
specific grant of authority to which the municipality can point as being
indicative of the requisite state intent.
On a more practical level, the impact of Lafayette necessarily
disturbs the developing and increasingly well-lubricated concept of
cooperative autonomy between states and their subdivisions. The
future of home rule, at least with respect to economic policies, may lie
in the balance. 3 If municipalities are required to seek a legislative
mandate for each and every decision made which might later be found
anticompetitive, and not otherwise sufficiently sanctioned, the Court
returns full circle to Dillion's Rule that cities are "mere instrumentalities" of the states"4 - a position the plurality boldly asserts.5
Apparently the Court is willing to allow a case by case determination
of whether an act is "authorized," a standard which is vague and
uncertain unless it implies (as the dissent argues) that specific
legislative enactment is the only true assurance that the Parker exemption will later be available. This uncertainty may cause widespread
apprehension in initiating social and economic innovations, such as
utility cooperatives. Such an impairment of the states' abilities to
delegate governmental powers to cities may result in fewer services and
higher prices to residents.
What municipalities will probably have to rely upon is circumstantial proof that the legislature knew the anticompetitive effects of the
challenged activity and implicitly approved it. This is actually an
72. 435 U.S. at 416 (1978).
73. This point is expressly made in the dissent, that Lafayette "marks an extraordinary intrusion into the operation of state and local government in this country."
435 U.S. at 434 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (referring indirectly to the following language
in the Court's footnote 15: "Local self-government is broadest in 'home rule'
municipalities, which can be almost entirely free from legislative control in local matters."). See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 269 (1968).
74. DILLION, LAW OF MUNICPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1873).

75. 435 U.S. at 413 (1978).
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inquiry into the motives and state of mind of state legislatures. It is
arguable that this requires an improper intrusion by the judiciary into
the legislative function. Indeed, the dissent in Lafayette voiced precisely this concern when it warned: "[T]he effect of today's decision is
greatly to impair the ability of a State to delegate governmental power
broadly to its municipalities. Such extensive interference with the fundamentals of state government is not a proper function of the federal
judiciary.""
Nonetheless, as in civil rights litigation, the federal courts are more
frequently inquiring into the motive and intent of state legislators
through circumstantial evidence. As a defendant in an antitrust case,
the municipality is, ironically, in much the same position as the civil
rights plaintiff when trying to prove the existence of a specific motive
on the part of the state legislature. There are cases holding that under
the fourteenth amendment circumstantial proof of an illicit motive in
the legislature need not be proof that the illicit motive was the only
reason for the legislature's actions. 7 The showing in such cases would
merely be that illicit motivation was a substantial or a material component of the legislative action.
Similarly, a municipal defendant in an antitrust action might argue
that a wide variety of considerations was in the minds or the collective
head of the legislature, including economic necessity and efficient
operation. The municipal defendant would argue that the anticompetitive effects contributed in part to the legislative authorization
to go forward with the challenged activity, even if the consideration of
such effects was not the primary motive. An example of this kind of
analysis is found in Murdock v. City of Jacksonville.78 In Murdock,
the court indicated that when the legislature granted the county the
power to lease its coliseum, it had in mind that the county would lease
the coliseum to each one of particular classes of impresarios. The court
imputed to the legislature and to the county board an appreciation of
the fact that leases can be exclusive.
As indicated in Gomillion v. Lightfoot," the Tuskegee, Alabama,
76. Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
77. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 47 U.S.L.W. 4650 (June 5, 1979);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
78. 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973). In Murdock, liability for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act by a private wrestling promoter, the City of
Jacksonville, Florida, and its mayor, were at issue. The City's legislative and
administrative authorities determined to rent a public coliseum for wrestling only one
night per week. That lease was given exclusively to another promoter precluding Murdock, in effect, from promoting wrestling matches in downtown Jacksonville.
79. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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gerrymandering case, some state legislation may, on its face, have
nothing other than an illicit motive. In Gomillion, the Supreme Court
determined that nothing but racial motivation could explain the action
of the state legislature in taking a square city and turning its boundaries into a multi-sided figure that excluded virtually all black voters.
In an antitrust case, a municipality might use the logic of the
Gomillion Court to prove that the legislature could have intended
nothing but a restaint on competition in approving or authorizing a
particular municipal activity. Expert economists could suggest to the
court that on the facts of the case, a municipal activity is guaranteed to
be anticompetitive, and that the legislature could not have anticipated
otherwise.
In addition, a municipal defendant might prove legislative intent
by a "before and after" test, through a comparison of the structure of
the municipal operations before the legislative authorization for a particular municipal activity with the structure afterward. This might be
adequate circumstantial proof that the legislature expected and intended the improved economics of an operation that is challenged as
anticompetitive.
C.

Areas of PotentialAntitrust Liability

In the past, certain municipal operations have generated antitrust
litigation. The Lafayette decision enhances the likelihood that antitrust
claims will increasingly be asserted against municipalities for such
operations. Cities especially engage in a broad range of regulatory and
proprietary activities which simulate the federal regulatory structure,
and which may be areas of potential abuse. Officials of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice have singled out ten areas of city
government operations which may be subjected to antitrust abuse.
These areas include occupational licensing and regulation, the operation of sports arenas and convention facilities, the operation of garbage collection services, transit system operations including taxicab
monopolies, public health services, airports, parking lots, procurement
practices, zoning and the provision of utility services including water
and electricity. 8" Courts may face antitrust claims regarding municipal
activities in these areas as well as other areas not traditionally thought
to have antitrust implications.
In remarks to the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Municipal Finance
Officers Association, May 15, 1978, Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant
80. Address by J. Sims, "Antitrust Comes to Main Street," (unpublished speech
at 72nd Annual Meeting of the Municipal Finance Officers Association, Houston
Texas) (May 15, 1978).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/3
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Attorney General, Antitrust Division, suggested a few areas, without
exhausting the possibilities, where his division felt state or local
governmental action might raise antitrust issues after Lafayette.
Herewith is a detailed review of that list with some comments and
examples.
1.

Any Regulatory Activity, Including Occupations Licensing.8"

The decision handed down by the Minnesota Federal District
Court, in Cedar-RiversideAssociation, Inc. v. United States,8" found
that the City of Minneapolis and its housing and development
authority, while not automatically immune from a private housing
developer's antitrust charges, did qualify for immunity in light of the
Lafayette decision by virtue of state statutes which gave municipalities
a lawful monopoly over the redevelopment of urban areas. But the
court refused to dismiss a count charging that municipal entities had
exceeded the scope of their monopoly authority, even though it appeared unlikely that the claim could be successful.
In another context, in what appears to be the first direct action
against a state board, the Antitrust Division launched a successful
challenge against the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy.
Although not involving a municipality, this decision involved postLafayette interpretations of the Parker exemption, which may be
illustrative of the extent to which the courts will restrict application
of the exemption. United States v. Texas Board of Public Accountancy8 3 involved a rule issued by the Texas State Board of Public
Accountancy which prevented accountants from submitting competitive bids, quoting prices, or giving any type of fee estimate to a
potential client, prior to engagement of the accountant, when the
accountant had reason to believe that proposals were being solicited
concurrently from other public accountants. In holding that the rule
was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court
refused to accept the defendant's asserted immunity under Parker.
Following the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Lafayette, the
court found that the rule was "not mandated by any state regulation
or action." 8" The Texas Accountancy Act, which the defendant claimed
authorized its adoption of the rule, provided that the Board "may

81.

Id.

82. 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978). In this case, by merely pleading that the
defendants exceeded their state authorization, the plaintiff prevailed on a defendant's
motion to dismiss which would not even have occurred before Lafayette.
83. 464 F. Supp..400 (W.D. Tex. 1978), modified, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979).
84. Id.at 404.
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promulgate, and may amend from time to time, Rules of Professional Conduct appropriate to establish a high standard of integrity
in the profession of public accountancy." 8 The court held that this
Act was
[c]ast in permissive, not mandatory, language and, furthermore,
only allows adoption of Rules appropriate for maintenance of high
standards of integrity in the Accountancy profession. Nowhere in
the Act does the state as sovereign mandate the anticompetitive
conduct required by [the Board's rule], nor is such policy dictated
by the State."
The court further determined that the Accountancy Act in no way concerned or contemplated the kind of action complained of in the case
before it. Accordingly, the court found that the state had not authorized or directed the anticompetitive practice and refused to extend
Parker immunity to the Board's actions. 7
The state legislative authority for the Board to "promulgate ethical
rules" had been exceeded by the Board's rule prohibiting competitive
bidding by accountants. The Board's defense of "state action exemption" failed, with the court saying the anticompetitive rule was a clear
antitrust violation and the state action defense simply was not
applicable in light of the Lafayette case. Nowhere in the statute did the
state, as sovereign, mandate anticompetitive conduct, nor did the
policy of ethics regulation in any way concern or contemplate the kind
of action which was challenged by the plaintiff.
2.

The Operation of Sports Arenas or Convention Centers.8

The District of Columbia Armory Board, the agency that operates
Robert F. Kennedy Stadium, gave an exclusive lease to the Washington
Redskins to use that stadium. The lease was attacked by a promoter
who wanted to set up another professional football team in Washington, D.C. In Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc.,' 9 upon review of the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the
appellate court discussed at length Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.9" and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington9 along with the Parker exemption issue related to the
stadium lease arrangement.
85. Id. at 402.
86. Id. at 404.
87. Id.
88. Sims, supra note 80.
89. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
90. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
91. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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In Noerr, a complaint was filed on behalf of forty-one Pennsylvania truck operators and their trade association against twentyfour eastern railroads, an association of the presidents of those
railroads, and a public relations firm, charging the defendants with
conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize long-distance freight
business in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The gist
of the complaint alleged that the railroads had engaged the public relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign to create an atmosphere of
disdain for the truckers and to promote laws and law enforcement
practices destructive of the trucking business. The Noerr Court held
inter alia that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature
. . . to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce

a restraint or a monopoly." 9 2 This would be true even if the resulting
official action damages other competitiors. In Pennington, a coal mining company crossclaimed against the United Mine Workers alleging a
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Among other things, the company
alleged that the union conspired to drive small coal companies out of
the market, by having the Secretary of Labor establish high minimum
wage rates, and by urging the Tennessee Valley Authority to curtail
certain "spot" market purchases. In following Noerr, the Pennington
Court stated that concerted efforts to influence public officials would
not violate the Sherman Act even though such conduct was intended to
eliminate competition."'
The Hecht Court followed the Noerr-Pennington rationale to the
extent that first amendment rights might have been implicated.9 But
the court held that the lease agreement between the Redskins and the
Armory Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws on that limited
ground, stating that "the validity of the thirty-year lease . . must be
tested in accordance with the United States antitrust laws as usually
applied to contracts between private parties." 9 5
In addition to the restriction of users of public facilities, the manner of operation of such facilities may also present antitrust problems.
The vulnerability of public administrators involved in a group boycott,
92. 365 U.S. at 136.
93. 381 U.S. at 670.
94. 444 F.2d at 940 & n.31.
95. Id. at 947. On remand, the district court again entered judgment for the
defendants, but the appellate court reversed holding that the relevant market had been
defined too narrowly and that the jury had been improperly instructed regarding
intent. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436

U.S. 956 (1978).
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which form of conduct is a "per se" liability under the antitrust
96
statutes, is demonstrated in Duke & Co. v. Foerster. In that case,
municipal employees, acting in concert with concession operators to
forbid a particular brand of malt beverage from being sold in the
municipal facilities, were found to be in violation of the antitrust
laws. 97
3.

The Provision of Water, Electric and Other Utility Services."

In Mobilfone of Northeastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Com°
monwealth Telephone Co.," the court followed Goldfarb,'"
0 2 in performing an analysis of the legislative
Cantor,'1' and Bates,'
intent test, and allowed a Parkerexemption. The court noted that the
relevant statute clearly and affirmatively expressed a state policy which
viewed radio paging as a public utility. The statute also indicated that
the state has an independent regulatory interest in radio-telephone
paging services, therefore, the state's public utility law justified subordination of the federal antitrust laws to the state policy of regulating
103
competition in an area of newly developing services.
In the newly developing field of cable television franchises, it
would appear states likewise have an independent regulatory interest.
The Mobilfone case may provide some solace to municipal
administrators who are being challenged in their refusal to grant
increased franchise cable television rates.
4.

Garbage Collection. l0'

Garbage collection is another area in which antitrust problems may
arise. A city may decide to contract for the provision of garbage
disposal, rather than provide it itself. In so doing it may decide to
grant one company an exclusive contract to provide such service to the
city inhabitants, which in turn may spark antitrust litigation by disappointed contractors.' 5 This situation is simply another illustration of
96. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
97. Id.
98. Sims, supra note 80.
99. 428 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
100. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
101. 428 U.S. 579 (1977).
102. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
103. 428 F. Supp. at 132-35.
104. Sims, supra note 80.
105. See Sun Valley Disposal Co., Inc. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1969). Sun Valley Disposal Co., Inc. operated a garbage pick up and disposal
service in Clark County, Nevada. Sun Valley competed with the defendant for garbage
collection business in the area. The defendant obtained an exclusive franchise for the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/3
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an exclusive grant by a government to a private contractor to provide
services for a governmental facility, or for citizens of the government,
6
giving rise to antitrust considerations."
5.

1
Transit Systems, Including Taxis. ""

Municipalities may be involved with transportation in a number of
different methods. They may grant private companies the exclusive
right to provide some form of transportation throughout the city, or in
particular geographical areas, or to various citizen groups. Similarly, a
municipality may grant an exclusive franchise to one company to provide transportation service in connection with the operation of
municipally owned facilities, such as hospitals and airports. The type
of antitrust problem that arises in connection with transportation
again involves the grant of an exclusive right to one private company
to provide these services within the city, or at a city facility, to the
exclusion of other contractors. In the past, it has usually been the case
that the grant of an exclusive right to one contractor to provide 0a
transportation service has been held not subject to the antitrust law.'
But in one case decided after Lafayette, the possibility of liability
09
an exclusive
was exposed. In Woolen v. Surtrans Taxicabs, Inc.,'
Airport
Regional
contract for taxi service to the Dallas - Fort Worth
was attacked by competitors. The airport, the exclusive franchisee, and
the towns enacting ordinances supporting the exclusive franchise were
unable to overcome the challenge, again because of lack of specific
state authority to grant a monopoly on taxi service.110 Exclusive franchises at public facilities are so common that this case appears to present a very broad threat to municipalities. With only the "rule of
reason" as a defense, each city franchise or lease must be reexamined
for any anticompetitive impact which results in an unnecessarily
limited number of franchises for the space available. Use of unjustifiably high bidding qualification standards and commitment to
long-term leases may make such franchises suspect. Because any
unsuccessful bidder can now contest exclusive or limited franchises,
and tie up an award with protracted and expensive litigation, the
of Sun
county's garbage pickup and disposal, which resulted in the termination Valley's
Sun
rejected
Pennington,
and
Noerr
following
court,
The
business.
Valley's
doubt
claim that the contract violated sections 1and 2 of the Sherman Act. There is no
Lafayette.
of
light
in
today
differently
decided
be
would
case
that this
106. See, e.g., notes 88-97 and accompanying text supra.
107. Sims, supra note 80.
108. See, e.g., Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir. 1970).
109. 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
110. Id. at 1033.
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reexamination should take place early in the rebidding cycle as each
franchise or lease comes up for renewal or award.
6. Public Health Services."'
In City of Fairfax v. FairfaxHospital Association, the appellate
court found that activities supporting public health and welfare are not
automatically immunized if a municipality, absent a state mandate,
exercises its options and engages in activity which arguably has anticompetitive consequences. In Huron Valley Hospital Association v.
City of Pontiac,"3 however, the court found a state exemption
applicable under the Lafayette theory. An antitrust action for treble
damages and injunctive relief was brought by a non-profit hospital
organization against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Michigan health facilities, state and regional regulatory agencies,
and the City of Pontiac. A conspiracy to permit the city's hospital to
maintain its monopoly of hospital facilities was alleged, based on
efforts to deny the plaintiff a permit to build a new hospital. The court
derived state exemption for the state and regional agencies from
express legislative requirements that the state agencies regulate the construction of health facilities in order to control costs to the public. The
city's motion for summary judgment was granted under the NoerrPennington' "' doctrine, because its role was'limited to attempts to
influence governmental agencies acting within their state authorized
roles. But, significantly, the Noerr-Penningtonrule was thought to be
available only when state action immunity would be available to the
public agencies being influenced.'
7.

Airports.''

6

As concentrated centers of commercial activity, public airports are
fraught with circumstances which may generate antitrust challenges.
With deregulation of airline rates creating an avalanche of demands on
limited airport facilities, one of several perplexing problems for airport
operators is the equitable apportionment of prime "slot" time among
competing airlines.
8.

Parking Lots." '
Cities may operate parking lots or contract with private firms for
111. Sims, supra note 80.
112. 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978).
113. 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979).

114. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
115. 466 F.Supp. at 1315.
116. Sims, supra note 80.
117. Id.
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the provision of this service. A parking lot may be part of a larger
municipal facility, such as a civic center, airport, or sports arena, or it
may be an independent parking facility. In any event, the types of antitrust problems that will arise here are quite similar to those discussed
above. Normally, the antitrust litigation will be initiated by a firm that
8
has been excluded from dealing with the municipality."
9.

Procurement Practices Generally.'9

In making a procurement decision, a municipality normally
chooses one vendor over another. Municipal governments are
accustomed to dealing with the disappointment of losing vendors.
Now, however, such vendors may vent their disappointment through
the institution of an antitrust suit, viewing litigation as an attractive
response to the adverse municipal procurement decision.
Antitrust litigation involving municipal procurement decisions
seems most likely in three types of factual settings. First, losing bidders
may bring antitrust suits where some sort of vendor favoritism appears
to have occurred. Vendor favoritism involves a practice of preferring
local vendors, past vendors, or friends, or any type of informal
preference based on those types of associations. This type of
favoritism may take a variety of forms. It may involve the use of proprietary specifications which favor a particular vendor or brand and
which make it difficult, if not impossible, for other vendors or brands
to qualify as bidders. Where there is no technological justification for
writing such specifications, a municipality may be faced with litigation
in the form of an antitrust suit. At times, procurement officials have
simply copied the engineering manual of one vendor in drawing bid
specifications, without including an "or equal" clause or without
allotting sufficient bidding time for potential competitors to meet the
specifications of the qualified item. It appears that proprietary
specifications are sometimes used because the government procurement officer simply thinks it is not worth the trouble of drawing up
specifications that treat all vendors or brands equally. Municipalities
should insure, however, that specifications are chosen carefully, are
justified by technological considerations, and do not unfairly
discriminate against particular vendors or brands. Moreover, proprietary specifications may not comply with state or local bidding
statutes.' 20 Similarly, other forms of noncriminal vendor favoritism
may violate state or local competitive bidding statutes or regulations.
118. Cf. Dominion Parking Corp. v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., [1978] 1 Trade Cases
(CCH) 62,018.
119. Sims, supra note 80.
Gen. Op. 75-11 (R-13) (R75-619).
Ariz. Atty.
[1975]
120. by
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Because of the general attractiveness of antitrust remedies and for
other procedural reasons, disappointed bidders may seek to attack
these types of procurement decisions through antitrust suits rather
than suits based on bidding statutes or regulations. Without regard to
the exemption issue, some courts have taken the position that it is not
a violation of the federal antitrust laws to fail to comply with state or
local competitive bidding requirements or to show favoritism for particular vendors. 2 ' The rationale of these decisions, however, seems
questionable, and other courts may find antitrust violations in this
context.
Vendor preference laws are a second facet of procurement activity
that might spark antitrust litigation. These preference laws may either
involve a "Buy American" requirement, or mandate a percentage
allocation to local vendors. Various antitrust authorities have pointed
22
out the anticompetitive effects of these preference laws.
A final, and rather special type of municipal procurement problem
involves risk managment. Persons who have the responsibility for purchasing insurance or selecting health plans for municipalities often
seem to be overwhelmed by this task, and readily admit that they are
ignorant about the nuances of insurance planning. Therefore, they
have turned for assistance to local insurance companies and agents. In
some cases, the municipality in question has formed a risk management advisory panel consisting of local insurance agents to advise on
these matters. Risk management advisory panels have frequently
recommended to the municipality that the business be divided equally
among all insurance companies represented on a panel. A panel may
also recommend that certain types of coverage be included or
excluded.
There are substantial antitrust problems in creating a risk management adivsory panel composed of the insurance companies or agents
who will later sell insurance to the municipality. Risk management
plans that divide the business among the members of these panels
involve horizontal market allocations, which are treated as per se
illegal under the antitrust laws. Also, the panel's agreement to
eliminate certain types of coverage removes any uncertainty regarding
the actions of competitiors and has clear anticompetitive effects.
121. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508
F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Security Fire Door Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 484 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1973); Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v.
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
122. Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law v. Anti-Competitive State Regulation, 39
ANTITRUST L.J. 950, 955-57 (1970). See also Slater, Antitrust and Government Action:
A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. L. REV. 71, 75 (1974).
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Moreover, it is unlikely that the activities of these types of risk
management advisory panels would be exempt from the antitrust laws.
In some cases, there is no statutory authority for the formation of risk
management advisory panels and there is, generally, no legislative
mandate to displace competition in the procurement of insurance.
10.

Zoning Activities.' 2 3

Zoning is an activity that might seem somewhat remote from
antitrust law. The dissenters in Lafayette explicitly make the point,
however, that the expanded municipal antitrust liability wrought by
that decision will likely impinge upon local land use and zoning decisions.' 24 Even prior to Lafayette, there were at least three suits
challenging zoning restrictions on antitrust grounds, which had
resulted in lower federal court decisions. A review of the facts and
dispositions in each case is instructive.
The facts as alleged by the plaintiff landowner in Whitworth v.
Perkins,'2 5 which has been remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Lafayette, present a near perfect example of the
misuse of zoing laws for the aggrandizement of monopolistic powers.
Perkins, one of the individual defendants, had incorporated the new
town of Impact, Texas, near the City of Abilene, and had turned
development of the town over to a corporation in which he was involved. Significantly, neither the City of Abilene nor the surrounding
county permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages; however, the town of
Impact, exercising a local option available under Texas law, elected to
allow liquor, thereby creating "an 'oasis' on the boundary of a 'dry'
city in a 'dry' county.' '2 6 At the time of the suit, only two corporations were authorized to sell alcoholic beverages in Impact. The plaintiff, an operator of a food store, had sought authorization to sell alcoholic beverages also, but was denied such authorization by the town
because the ostensible "residential" zoning classification of his land
precluded such sales under applicable ordinance.
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants,
including the town, its aldermen, and the benefited corporations,
reasoning that the presence of the zoning ordinance, enacted in accordance with state law, "bars recovery regardless of whether defendants'
actions otherwise violate the antitrust laws.""' In reversing, the court
of appeals stated: "The mere presence of the zonini ordinance does
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Sims, supra note 80.
435 U.S. at 438.
559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 379.
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not necessarily insulate the defendants from antitrust liability where, as
here, the plaintiff asserts that the enactment of the ordinance was itself
a part of the alleged conspiracy to restrain trade."' 2 8
In Nelson v. Utah County' 9 plaintiff land developers sued the
county, the County Commissioners, members of the County Planning
Commission, the County Zoning Administrator, and two allegedly
favored real estate firms, claiming that a conspiracy in the selective
rezoning of plaintiffs' vacant land, resulting in increased tax
assessments, coupled with persistent and discriminatory refusals to
issue building permits to plaintiffs, was pursued as a means of
eliminating plaintiffs as competitors in the land development business.
Significantly, it appeared that the Chairman of the County Commission was the owner of one of the two allegedly benefited real estate
firms, and it was alleged that his firm had consistently received
building permits and land use authorizations in circumstances similar
to those in which permits and authorizations had been denied to
plaintiffs.
In an unreported decision the district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss on grounds of the Parker antitrust exemption,
stating "[t]he exercise and application of the zoning power are discretionary and consequently not automatically within the scope of the
Parker state-action exemption." 3 0
Faring less successfully with an antitrust claim was a plaintiff
quarry owner in Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township
Civic Association.'' Here, certain neighbors and town residents,
evidently annoyed by the conditions of plaintiff's quarrying activities,
acted through their civic association and successfully petitioned town
and state environmental authorities to impose restrictive conditions
upon, and otherwise curtail, plaintiff's operations. Claiming that the
resulting restrictions decreased its production and thereby reduced its
viability "as a competitor in the interstate market for stone and stone
products,"' 3 2 the plaintiff sued the civic association and certain
individual residents under federal antitrust laws. The court properly
showed no reluctance in dismissing the action, first, because there was
no allegation of any commercial aspect or motivation to the defendants' actions and, second, because even if the defendants had acted for
advancement of their own business purposes, it was clear, under
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. For a good discussion of this case, see 57 NEB. L. REV. 1140 (1978).
No. C76-423 (D. Utah 1977).
Id.
443 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1213 (1979).
Id. at 1271.
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Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,'" that "attempts to influence the enforcement or passage of
laws," short of the use of bribery or undue influence, cannot, under
our system of recognized political rights, be made the basis of antitrust
violations.' 3
Antitrust litigation might also arise regarding the zoning of shopping centers. For example, zoning ordinances that are used to exclude
discount stores from shopping centers or, more generally, from particular areas,' 3 5 or used to require that shopping centers limit the
number of particular types of stores, might provide antitrust litigation.
Similarly, zoning ordinances that are used to restrict the location of
mobile homes or operation of mobile home parks may also prompt an
antitrust suit.
Whenever a local government uses or refuses to use its zoning
power, it may benefit the economic interests of some inhabitants and
impinge upon the economic interests of others. Again, the antitrust
laws become another attractive and available weapon in the arsenal of
those who feel they have been wronged and harmed economically by
municipal action pursuant to a municipality's zoning power. In view of
the paucity of cases involving antitrust actions challenging abuses of
zoning power, a practitioner considering bringing or defending such a
to cases involving
suit may be well advised to extend his research
36
contexts.
other
in
liability
antitrust
municipal
D.

Distinguishing Between Litigation and Liability

In commenting on the ten problem areas pointed out above, it
should be noted that they are only areas of likely antitrust litigation
involving municipalities. The compilation does not automatically mean
that municipalities should normally be found to have violated the
antitrust laws for involvement in these activities, or, indeed, that the
antitrust laws are necessarily applicable to given municipal activity.
For this reason, some further comments on the antitrust liability of
municipalities and their officials are in order.
133. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
134. 443 F. Supp. at 1271.
135. See, e.g., Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal.
App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977).
136. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S 992 (1978) (dismissal of complaint alleging sham bidding
and favoritism in the awarding of pro shop concessions at municipal golf courses was
improper); Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (complaint
alleging boycott of plaintiff's beverages at municipal airport and stadium stated antitrust cause of action; Noerr's antitrust exemption for lobbying activities does not apply
where the governmental entity collaborates to promote the conspiracy).
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While municipal activities in the above described areas and,
perhaps, others may spark antitrust litigation, it would be quite wrong
to assume that such litigation would frequently result in a finding that
a municiaplity or its officials had violated the antitrust laws. In the
first place, as mentioned above, the Lafayette case only held that
municipalities were not automatically immune because of their status
as political subdivisions of the state. It did not say that all municipal
activity was automatically subject to federal antitrust laws. Therefore,
it is likely that in some of the activities described above, municipalities
3 I It is important to
will be held exempt from the federal antitrust laws. ,
add, however, that while some activities may be exempt, a municipality
will have a more difficult time establishing immunity than does a state.
Moreover, in light of the numerous Supreme Court decisions in the last
few years dealing with the Parkerstate-action exemption issue, it may
be neither wise nor prudent to rely too heavily on earlier district court
and court of appeal decisions.
If no immunity from federal law is found, it does not mean that a
municipality will be held liable under the antitrust laws. Some of the
practices challenged will be found not to constitute antitrust violations.
This is particularly true in cases where a municipality decides to grant
an exclusive right to one contractor to provide various services at a
municipal facility or to the inhabitants of the municipality. 3 ' Unless
the municipal activity falls into an area of per se illegality, such as
price-fixing or market allocation, the ultimate resolution of the
antitrust issues will depend upon an application of the rule of reason,
which involves weighing the social harms and benefits, and consideration of less restrictive alternatives for achieving the desired benefits.
Finally, a municipality or its officials are more likely to be found to
have acted illegally under the antitrust laws when they can be
characterized as being involved in a private conspiracy, rather than
performing purely governmental activities.
Even if no exemption is available and an antitrust violation is
found to have occurred, the question of remedy remains. Criminal
sanctions are unlikely to be sought and even more unlikely to be
imposed. Traditional antitrust remedies also include appropriate
equitable relief and treble damages for any person who is "injured in
his business or property." 13 9 Unless municipal officials are knowingly
137. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (dealing with lawyer
advertising).
138. See Sun Valley Disposal Co., Inc. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1969); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52
(1st Cir. 1966). See also Areeda & Turner, supra note 71, at 1 217.
139. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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involved in a private antitrust conspiracy, however, it is likely courts
will be reluctant to impose treble damage liability upon municipalities
or their officials. The financial consequences of treble damage liability
on municipalities was pointed out by the dissent in the Lafayette
case.' 4 ° Moreover, it seems somewhat unfair to impose treble damage
liablility on municipal officials who may have believed they were acting
in accordance with a valid local or state law. It is probable that the
courts will be sensitive to these and other problems in imposing treble
damages upon municipalities or their officials.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court decision in the Lafayette case will likely cause
a rise in antitrust litigation involving municipalities. Leaving aside the
Huron Valley Hospital'41 case, there have actually been only three
cases since Lafayette which raise serious concerns for local government: Whitworth v. Perkins'42 in zoning, Cedar-Riverside Association
Inc. v. United States'43 in redevelopment regulations, and Woolen v.
Surtrans Taxicabs, Inc. 144 relating to exclusive franchises for taxicabs.
But the limited number of cases does not mean that more are not coming. There is, however, a long road between the filing of a suit against
a municipality and the ultimate finding of antitrust liability. Some
municipal activity will be found exempt, other activity will be found
not to involve an antitrust violation, and an award of treble damages
seems even less likely. Moreover, cautious plaintiffs may wisely refrain
from suing municipalities or their officials if private defendants exist
and adequate relief can thereby be obtained without suing public
defendants. Furthermore, governmental antitrust authorities, particularly state attorney generals, may be reluctant to sue local governments, especially if there are other avenues for obtaining relief. Thus,
municipalities ought not overreact to the Supreme Court decision in the
Lafayette case. They should, however, be more cautious about pursuing local government activity that has anticompetitive effects. More
specifically, it would seem prudent for a state or local government to
consider the competitive impact of the types of governmental activities
described above. State and local officials must be particularly sensitive
and cautious about becoming involved in a private conspiracy.
140. 435 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
141.
142.

466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978). See text accompa-

nying notes 125-128 supra.
143.
144.

459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978). See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978). See text accompanying notes 109-110
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As discussed, municipalities should be aware that antitrust actions
may often be nuisance litigation. In many instances the plaintiffs may
not be interested at all in seeking the large monetary amounts that such
litigation suggests. This point was recently demonstrated by the
announcement that the cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, and the
Louisiana Power & Light Co., had settled their dispute, with a central
feature of the settlement being an agreement that the parties release
each other from any monetary liability. When the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Lafayette, Justice Blackmun pointed out
in dissent that LP&L was seeking treble damages in excess of $540
million, or approximately $28,000 for each family of four in the two
cities. The provisions of the settlement between the parties would
indicate that substantive antitrust considerations were not motivating
factors in the dispute between the parties. Thus, a threshold inquiry
by a defendant municipality into the true motives of the plaintiffs in an
antitrust action may allow the municipality to avoid the extended and
costly litigation that might otherwise follow.
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